This paper questions the ability of the standard HOS (Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson) model to explain changes in the labor shares (LS) of income in OECD countries. We use the Davis (1998) version of the HOS model where there is a wage rigidity in a sub-group of countries. We show that trade openness with developing countries reduces LS in rigid-wage countries, and does not a¤ect LS in free-wage countries. This pattern is induced by factor reallocation towards capital-intensive sectors in rigid-wage countries. Using the KLEMS dataset for 8 OECD countries over the period 1970-2005, we show that the weight of capital-intensive sectors substantially increased in Continental European countries, while it did not change or even decreased in the US and the UK. Fixed e¤ects regressions suggest that trade intensity with China explains between 50% (IV estimates) and 80% (OLS estimates) of the observed di¤erential labor share change between Continental Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries.
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Since Blanchard (1997) , several papers considered the role of technological change (see e.g. Hornstein et al, 2002 , Acemoglu, 2003 , Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003 , Guscina, 2006 , and Ellis and Smith, 2007 . The main shortcoming of this approach is that, according to Nordhaus (1997) , it seems unrealistic that production techniques used in continental European countries remain unknown in the Anglo-Saxon world. More recently, Karabarbounis and Neiman point out the role of the rapid decrease in the price of investment goods to explain the recently observed decreasing trends.
The other explanation is based on institutional change (good and labor market). Blanchard (1997) and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) argue that the decrease in European LS may be due to (i) an increase in the mark-up of price over marginal costs related to good market regulations, and/or (ii) a decrease in workers'bargaining power due to labor market reforms. In the same vein, Checchi and Garcia-Peñalosa (2007) put forward the roles of unemployment bene…ts and the minimum wage. Indeed, the decrease in unemployment bene…ts or the minimum wage observed during the 90's in many OECD countries may have a¤ected the bargaining power of workers as highlighted in standard labor market matching models (see Pissarides, 2000 for instance).
However, a mark-up increase is not really plausible given that the 1980s and the 1990s are characterized by European integration, globalization and product market deregulation. Meanwhile, reforms have been more timid and piecemeal on the labor market (Boeri et al, 2000) . In France for instance, the early 1980s saw the introduction of stricter regulations rather than softer ones.
Several studies focus on labor shares at disaggregate level. They tend to show that the labor share is stable at micro level, which contrasts with the patterns of aggregate shares. In those studies aggregate movement in the factor share are therefor related to composition e¤ects. Kyyra and Maliranta (2008) show that all the decreases observed in Finland from 1970 to 2000 are due to factor reallocation between existing …rms or plants. Böckerman and Maliranta (2009) show that trade is the main factor behind such factor reallocation. De Serres et al (2002) decompose variations in the labor share at industry level between 7 industries. From 1970 to 2000, sector reallocation implies a 7-point decrease in aggregate labor share in Germany, 4 points in France, 3 points in Italy, and 4 points in the Netherlands. More recently Author et al (2017) show that the weight of superstar …rms (whose labor share is lower) have increased in the last decades and has driven the recent decrease in the labor share for the US economy.
Recent literature deals with the impact of globalization on the LS. The basic HOS model without wage rigidity predicts that trade openness between labor-and capital-abundant countries decreases the LS in capital-abundant countries and increases it in labor-abundant countries as it should lower wages in capital-abundant countries. This theory fails to explain the variety of patterns that the di¤erent groups of OECD countries experience. Rodrik (1997) argues that openness hurts workers'bargaining power and makes wages decreasing at given output. Any increase in …rms' statu-quo position reduces the share of rents accruing to labor, thereby deteriorating the LS. 3 Harrison (2002) , for …nancial openness, and Ortega and Rodriguez (2002) , for international trade, develop models along these lines. Rodrik-type arguments are probably more suited to developing countries than to OECD countries. They imply that the labor share should decrease within …rms or sectors which is not the case in US (Author et al, 2017) or in Finland (Böckerman and Maliranta ,2009 ). Furthermore, those theories cannot predict the observed heterogeneity at the country level in the patterns of aggregate labor shares.
In this paper, we point out the role of trade and wage rigidities, or, more precisely, the fact that the trade impact on the labor share di¤ers according to whether the country is characterized by wage rigidity or not. In standard HOS theory, markets are perfectly competitive and factor prices are determined by factor endowments at the world level. The relative scarcity of capital with respect to labor determines the relative price of the capital-intensive good. In turn, such a relative price determines the relative factor price by Stolper-Samuelson theorem. In such a framework, the labor share should unambiguously decrease in capital abundant countries as labor is relatively scarce compared to the global world endowment. In the Davis (1998) version of the HOS model, a subset of countries participating in international trade set a wage rigidity that is not compatible with full employment. The wage rigidity does not alter the Stolper-Samuelson relationship, and the relative price of the capital-intensive good goes up. This must be true at the world level, leading to factor price equalization throughout the world. The employment cost of the rigidity is magni…ed and unemployment increases in rigid wage countries so that capital intensity at the world level is compatible with the relative factor cost of the rigid wage country.
We use the Davis model to predict the impact of trade openness and wage rigidities on the labor shares of income. We model the wage rigidity in a convenient form: we assume that the relative price of labor with respect to capital is exogenously given (and constant (2003): "the major decline in the share in the 1980s coincided with a further increase in the unemployment rate during that decade". No correlation should exist for the ‡exible wage countries.
We focus on two main implications.
First, increasing the rigid wage is more likely to decrease the labor share in a globalized world than in a closed economy. For instance, the labor share stays constant in a closed economy when sector-speci…c technologies are Cobb-Douglas and the utility function is log-linear. By contrast, and under the same technological assumptions, the labor share falls when the economy is open to international trade. A decline in European labor shares does not require any product market imperfections and involves more rigid wages rather than less rigid wages. It also means that European workers not only pay a huge price in terms of foregone jobs, but they also su¤er from low relative earnings prospects.
Second, we follow Davis and consider the implications of free trade between three economic zones:
Europe, the US and Newly Industrialized Countries. The European wage rigidity is set at the competitive level that prevails in autarky. Trade openness leads to a decline in European LS, while keeping the US share constant. Meanwhile, such changes at the aggregate level are compatible with stable labor shares at the …rm/sector level.
In the empirical part of the paper, we examine whether trade-induced factor reallocation can explain a substantial part of observed changes in labor shares across Continental Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries. We use the KLEMS dataset, which provides sectorial data for 8 OECD countries over the period 1970-2005. 4 To closely mimic the model, we build two super sectors. The capital-intensive sector is composed of sectors whose capital intensity is larger than the aggregate capital intensity at the country level in 1980. The labor-intensive sector is composed of the remaining sectors. Given its strong increase over the last decades and its current weight in total trade, it is a good candidate to identify the impact of trade with developing countries.
We …rst provide some descriptive evidence of (i) an increase in the capital intensive sector observed only in continental European countries (ii) movements in the labor share that coincide with an increase in the unemployment rate for continental European countries only. 
HOS, labor shares and wage rigidities
In this section, we confront the HOS model with wage rigidity to the set of facts reported in Section 2.
We …rst derive well-known results concerning the impact of factor accumulation and changes in relative factor costs on the labor share. Second, we brie ‡y remind Davis (1998) model with wage rigidity. Third, we discuss the e¤ects of trade and wage rigidity on the labor shares using the Davis model. Finally, we distinguish sector-speci…c e¤ects from composition e¤ects across sectors induced by factor reallocation in order to study the empirical validity of the model.
A reminder
Assume that there are two production factors, K and L; paid at their marginal product and used in a constant returns to scale technology. The Euler theorem implies that output is totally dispatched between capital and labor returns so that the labor share is:
where w is the nominal wage, r is the unit capital cost, ! = w=r is the relative wage, and k = K=L is capital intensity. Changes in LS result from changes in k and/or !. However, these variables are generally linked to each other.
We start with the case where the dependence is nil, which we name the trade view of the labor share.
Result 1 Trade view of the labor share
Let ! be given. Then, the labor share strictly decreases with capital intensity, that is @LS i =@k i < 0
Capital deepness lowers the labor share. This property has two implications. Suppose …rst that ! is the same across sectors. Then Result 1 means that capital-intensive sectors feature a lower labor share than labor-intensive sectors. Now, consider a set of countries forming a trade area. Factor Price Equalization theorem states that ! must be the same across countries. According to Result 1, country-speci…c labor share should decrease with capital intensity.
More generally, relative wage and capital intensity are positively related, which we summarize by the formal dependence ! = ! (k). A change in relative wage has two opposite e¤ects on the labor share:
Result 2 Classical view of the labor share
Let " = ! (@k=@!) =k be the elasticity of substitution between capital labor. The labor share strictly decreases with relative wage if and only if the elasticity of substitution is larger than one, that is @LS=@! < 0 is equivalent to " > 1
Firms substitute capital to labor when relative wage increases. The magnitude of this substitution is captured by the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. Following the classical view, the labor share should not depend on relative factor cost when aggregate output is Cobb-Douglas.
Result 3 Labor market view of the labor share
Let K be given and = ! (@L=@!) =L be the elasticity of the labor demand with respect to relative wage. The labor share strictly decreases with relative wage if and only if the elasticity of the labor demand is lower than 1, that is @LS=@! < 0 is equivalent to < 1
When capital does not adjust, relative factor cost alters capital intensity through its impact on employment:
Hence, we can rewrite the elasticity of substitution
The labor market view states that the labor share decreases with relative wage when the labor demand is su¢ ciently responsive to changes in relative factor cost.
Globalization in the context of relative factor price rigidity a¤ects capital intensity, the aggregate elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, and the elasticity of the labor demand with respect to relative factor price.
2.2 HOS model with relative wage rigidity Davis (1998) examines the impacts of wage rigidities on wage inequality and unemployment in the HOS framework. We now brie ‡y remind Davis model. The general assumptions of the model are very standard.
There are two sets of countries denoted by i = 1; 1, and two …nal goods produced from capital K and labor L. Technologies have constant-returns to scale in each sector, and they are the same in both countries (with possibly some di¤erence in total factor productivity). The relative price of the capital-intensive good is p. Preferences over the two goods are the same across countries, while factor endowments di¤er between countries. Country 1 is endowed with (K 1 ; N 1 ), while country -1 is endowed with (K 1 ; N 1 ). Capital is relatively more abundant in country 1 than in country 1, so that K 1 =N 1 > K 1 =N 1 . The relative supply of capital at the world level is k s = (K 1 + K 1 ) = (N 1 + N 1 ). There is perfect competition in the good market. The labor market is perfectly competitive in country 1, while factor prices are not ‡exible in country 1. Davis considers an absolute wage rigidity. We slightly alter his reasoning and focus on a relative wage rigidity. Hereafter, the relative wage ! = w=r is …xed where w is the nominal wage and r the cost of one unit of capital. This choice is made for exposition clarity.
Davis model contains three endogenous variables: world relative price p, e¤ective capital intensity k, and employment L 1 in country 1. These three variables solve:
The …rst relationship is the Heckscher-Ohlin curve HO comes from Rybczinski. Following the Rybczinski theorem, an increase in capital intensity in a given country raises the relative supply of the capital-intensive good. In general equilibrium, this makes the relative price of that good (capital intensive) lower. This gives the familiar HO relation between capital endowment and the relative price of capital intensive good. That is, p 0 < 0: Evidently, the relationship goes both ways, a feature that the model with wage rigidity extensively uses. The second relationship is the Stolper-Samuelson curve SS.
The relative price p is the same in the whole integrated economy. When such a price of the capital intensive good increases, producing capital intensive good becomes more pro…table at a given factor cost.
Firms adjust the relative demand for capital as a result and the relative wage goes down. Owing to Factor Price Equalization theorem, the adjustment is the same in both countries. Here again, the relationship goes both ways and an increase in relative wage translates into a decrease in the relative price of the capital-intensive good. The third curve BR is a variant of the Brecher (1974) curve. Following an increase in the relative demand for capital (an increase in the capital intensity k at the world level), employment must fall in the integrated economy. As wages are perfectly ‡exible in country 1, such a fall in employment can only take place in country 1. At such a price, the (HO) curve implies that the relative demand for the capital-intensive good is larger than the relative supply with full employment. Consequently, the relative demand for capital is larger than the relative supply k s . Finally, the (BR) curve gives the resulting employment in country 1.
What happens when the relative wage rigidity increases, or when globalization expands to lessdeveloped trade partners? An increase in ! lowers the relative price of the capital-intensive good, thereby further increasing the relative demand for capital. Employment in country 1 decreases as a result, leaving unchanged employment in country 1. Alternatively, opening to trade with less-advanced economies means that K 1 increases by less than N 1 . The relative supply of capital falls as a result.
The (BR) curve moves rightward, which further deteriorates employment in country 1. The following
Result summarizes these predictions of the Davis model.
Result 4 Davis (1998) predictions
Let d! de…ne a marginal increase in relative wage rigidity, and (dK 1 ; dN 1 ) > 0 de…ne a marginal increase in globalization (i) A marginal increase in relative wage rigidity raises the relative demand for capital and lowers employment in country 1, that is dk=d! > 0 and dL 1 =d! < 0;
(ii) A marginal increase in globalization increases capital intensity and lowers employment in country 1 whenever the relative supply of capital decreases at the world level, that is dk 1 < 0 and
We now turn to the original part of the analysis: the labor share predictions and the ability of the Davis model to explain recent trends in the labor shares. The next sections present some corollaries of the Davis'model we derive with a focus on the labor share of income.
Labor share and globalization
Suppose that there is a marginal increase in globalization, that is (dK 1 ; dN 1 ) > 0, in the particular context where ! is …xed. Such a change in factor endowment alters the relative supply of capital at the world level, thereby changing the relative demand for capital and employment in country 1 (the rigid wage country). The labor share in country 1 is LS 1 = !=(! + k 1 ). It responds to the marginal change in globalization as follows:
The marginal change in capital intensity with respect to N 1 is
Using the Brecher relationship (BR), we obtain
Similarly, @k 1 =@K 1 = K 1 = (L 1 ) 2 (1=k) < 0. Therefore,
Proposition 1 Labor share and trade globalization At given !, a marginal increase in globalization negatively a¤ ects the labor share in country 1 whenever it increases the relative supply of capital, that is dLS 1 < 0 if and only if dK 1 =dN 1 < k.
Proposition 1 can be understood in light of Result 1. As labor-abundant economies enter the set of country 1, the relative supply of capital goes down, which further requires to increase capital intensity in country 1 (so that the world's capital intensity k is compatible with the rigid relative factor cost set by country 1) . Accordingly, Result 1 implies that at given !, an increase in the relative demand for capital leads to a decrease in the labor share of income. In other words, country 1 keeps the same relative factor cost but experiences a decrease in employment. This leads to a decrease in the labor share.
Proposition 1 also states that trade causes a negative correlation between unemployment and the labor share in countries that implement relative wage rigidities. By contrast, the correlation should not exist in countries where the labor market is perfectly competitive. This is consistent with the sharp increase in unemployment observed in continental European countries during the 80's and the 90's.
Labor share and relative wage rigidity
Changes in relative factor cost a¤ect the labor share according to the values of the elasticity of substitution and elasticity of the labor demand. However, trade a¤ects such elasticities, and, therefore, alters the e¤ects of wage rigidities. The aggregate elasticity of the labor demand is
Using the Brecher relationship (BR), we can decompose (9) in two terms
The …rst term depends on globalization. It is larger than 1 unless the autarkic case where N 1 = 0. Globalization increases the elasticity of labor demand with respect to autarky. The second term only depends on the technology as it corresponds to the aggregate elasticity of substitution at the world level.
Proposition 2 Labor share and relative wage rigidity
A marginal increase in relative wage rigidity implies a fall in the labor share when the elasticity of substitution at the world level is lower than
In a globalized world, wage rigidities are more likely to lower the labor share than in a closed economy.
Globalization increases the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor at the country level.
Indeed, a marginal increase in globalization modi…es the openness term O in equation (10):
It has the sign of dN 1 =N 1 dK 1 .
As an illustration, we solve the model with Cobb-Douglas technologies. Per capita output in sector
The utility function is U (c 1 ; c 2 ) = ln c 1 + ln c 2 . The HO and SS relationships write
where
Consequently, k! 0 (k)=! = 1. Therefore, dLS=d! < 0 whenever N 1 > 0. In autarky, factor accumulation and relative wage rigidity do no impact the aggregate labor share of income. Aggregate elasticity of substitution is equal to one. This corresponds to the standard Kaldor's stylized fact. This is no longer the case when the economy is open. This is due to the fact that the employment reaction to an increase in the relative factor cost w=r is much more important in an open economy and overcompensates the increase in relative wages.
Sector-speci…c vs aggregate labor share
Globalization and wage rigidities alter the aggregate labor share of income. Aggregate changes re ‡ect changes within and between sectors. Formally, aggregate labor share can be decomposed as follows:
the share of the capital intensive good a in total value-added and with Y a and Y b the output of sector a and b and with p a and p b the price of good a and b. As p = p a =p b , and denoting y = Y a =Y b relative output, we have a = py= (py + 1).
Consider a marginal increase in relative wage !:
The global e¤ect results from a composition e¤ect and sector-speci…c e¤ects. We start with the composition e¤ect. The relative wage rigidity increases the relative demand for capital k 1 . The Rybczinski theorem implies an increase in the supply of capital intensive good and factor reallocation towards the capital-intensive sector. It follows that dy=d! > 0. However, the increase in ! also causes a price e¤ect, namely a decline in the relative price p of the capital-intensive good. The relative strength of the two e¤ects depends on preferences, technologies, and trade openness. In a globalized world, the Rybczinski e¤ect is stronger than in autarky, and the share of the capital-intensive sector is more likely to increase. Now consider sector-speci…c e¤ects. Their signs depend on the technology along Result 2:
In the case of Cobb-Douglas technologies, the elasticity ! (dk i =d!) =k i = 1. This implies dLS i =d! = 0.
Changes in aggregate labor share then re ‡ect sector share changes. When preferences are log-linear, the Rybczinski e¤ect exactly o¤sets the price e¤ect in autarky, and overcrowds it when the country is open to trade. The labor share, therefore, stays constant under autarky and decreases otherwise.
Using the same rational we can decompose the impact of globalization (an increase in the world's labor or capital endowment N 1 or K 1 ) . We know the overall impact, namely dLS 1 =dN 1 < 0 while dLS 1 =dK 1 > 0. Such overall e¤ects only re ‡ect sector share changes: as ! and p stay constant, capital intensity does not change within sector (the maximization problem of the …rms do not change). Unlike the case of wage rigidity, globalization has non-ambiguous e¤ects on sector shares. Owing to the relative factor price rigidity, the relative price p of the capital-intensive good stays constant. In the rigid wage country 1, unemployment goes up and k 1 increases as a result. The Rybczinski e¤ect then implies that the relative supply of the capital intensive good increases and that the capital-intensive sector share a increases as a result.
Explaining LS changes
The model can predict the set of facts presented in the introduction, namely constant labor share in Anglo-Saxon countries, decreasing shares in continental European countries, and broadly constant shares at sector/…rm level. The relative wage rigidity ! t takes place in Europe. It stays …xed over time. As a benchmark, the initial value ensures that full employment holds in Europe in 1970, so that ! t = ! (k s 70 ). The model writes:
with k D;t = K D;t =N D;t , k AS;t = K AS;t =N AS;t , and k E;t = K E;t =L E;t . The fall in European aggregate labor shares is associated with factor reallocation towards capitalintensive sectors. The pattern of aggregate labor shares may contrast with micro (sector-speci…c) patterns. The model predicts that sector-speci…c shares do not change at industry/…rm level provided that technologies are Cobb-Douglas. This prediction distinguishes the HOS model with wage rigidity from the Rodrik-type models discussed in the introduction. In such models, the labor share goes down because globalization boosts the outside options of capital owners, pushing wages down at given output.
This mechanism should take place at …rm level, which contradicts the micro evidence presented in the introduction.
In developing countries, employment is determined by the labor supply N D;t . Globalization a¤ects the labor share through two distinct mechanisms, depending on whether we consider the country at world trade entry or after entry.
At entry, say in t (so the country is closed in t 1), the variation in the labor share is:
The labor share increases at world trade entry. It is consistent with labor share patterns observed in some Newly Industrialized Countries and East Asian countries.
After entry, the labor share is larger than in Europe and the US. The year-to-year change LS D;t has the sign of k s D;t . As long as those countries accumulate physical capital over time, the labor share must go down. This explanation to the decrease in the labor share of developing countries hinges on the fact that the corresponding countries belong to the diversi…cation cone of the developed economies. The evidence is mixed in this respect. Cunat (2000) and Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) show that factor price equalization must hold among developed countries but not with all developing countries suggesting multiple diversi…cation cones. Schoot (2003) argues that there are two diversi…cation cones. Debaere and Demiroglu (2006) suggest that newly industrialized countries and developed countries belong to the same diversi…cation cone. Overall, factor price equalization may hold at local level and countries accumulating capital at a higher rate than trade partners in the cone of diversi…cation can experience a decrease in the labor share.
Empirical evidence
This section confronts the model predictions to sectorial data. We want to assess whether trade with developing countries speci…cally increased the pace of factor reallocation towards capital-intensive sectors in Continental Europe, and whether such an increase leads to signi…cant changes in the labor share. We …rst present our dataset, and then turn to …xed e¤ects regressions.
Dataset
The KLEMS dataset provides sectorial data for 8 OECD countries among the 9 discussed in Section 2 over the period 1970-2005. 5 We use this dataset to compute labor shares and sector shares at sector level. The COMTRADE dataset provides country-speci…c data on trade intensity with China. We use this variable as a proxy for trade with developing countries. The China trade shock is now widely used in the literature (see for instance Autor et al 2013 or Autor et al 2016 as a proxy for the increasing trade with developing countries. It corresponds to a huge and plausibly exogenous shock of trade with developing countries given the weight of China in the world economy. It now accounts for a large fraction of trade with developing economies. Given its strong increase over the last decades and its current weight in total trade, it is a good candidate to identify the impact of trade with developing countries.
The KLEMS dataset covers 28 sectors. In each sector, there are data on wages, employment, output, and capital stock. Sector-speci…c and aggregate labor shares are computed as the ratio of total wage bill to value-added. The ratio is corrected from self-employment. Namely, we attribute the mean wage of employees at sector level to self-employed workers. the assumption of our model that ! is the same across sectors is a good approximation.
We build two super-sectors from the 28 sectors. A sector is capital-intensive if capital intensity is larger than the aggregate countrywide capital to labor ratio in 1980. That is, when a sector in a given country is classi…ed as capital intensive given its capital output ratio, it is considered as capital intensive for every years in this given country. 6 This corresponds to the SS 1 variable. For robustness purposes, we isolate tradable and business sectors and proceed similarly (respectively SS 3 and SS 2 variables). The tradable sectors are "Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing", "Mining and Quarrying", and "Total manufacturing". The business sector (27 sectors) excludes "Community social and personal services", which accounts for a large share of GDP in OECD countries. 5 The limited number of countries is due to the availability of the capital stock at the sector level. 6 we choose 1980 as the reference year because we do not want some sectors jump from capital intensive to labor intensive which would have possibly created some jumps in our aggregate sector share variable. In practice only some very few sectors with intermediate capital intensities moove from capital intensive to labor intensive sectors and the classi…cation of capital intensive sectors is very similar if we had taken 1990 or 2000 as the reference period. We have chosen to take the …rst year in our sample for which capital at the sector level is available for all countries. Also, 1980 correspond to the year during which the labor started to decline in continental european countries. for the whole economy (SS 1 ) is 58%, against 78% for the labor-intensive super-sector. The di¤erence is even stronger when we focus on tradable (SS 3 ) or business sectors (SS 2 ). In the Appendix, we show that this result holds at a more disaggregate level. Factor reallocation between sectors, therefore, can a¤ect the aggregate labor share. We will use those statistics to derive the impact of changes in the weight of the capital intensive sector in term of the labor share.
We need a trade variable that varies across countries, and that re ‡ects trade with developing countries rather than trade in general. We follow Michaels et al (2014) and consider the ratio of Chinese exports plus imports to GDP. This variable must be viewed as a proxy for overall trade with developing countries. 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 0 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 The magnitude of factor reallocation in civil-law countries is potentially promising to explain changes in aggregate labor share. For instance, SS 1 experiences a 6-point increase in civil-law countries and a 5-point decrease in common-law countries. The di¤erential change amounts to 11 points. The mean labor share is 58% in the capital-intensive sector, while it is 78% in the labor-intensive sector. Factor reallocation between sectors, therefore, can lead to a di¤erential change in labor share that amounts to 11*(0.78-0.58)=2.2 points. Introduction shows that the observed di¤erential change is about 3.5 points.
Factor reallocation between sectors, therefore, can explain up to 60% of the observed di¤erential change between the two sets of countries.
Of course, part of this change has nothing to do with trade. The purpose of the next sub-section is to measure the proportion of this change that can be directly attributed to trade with developing countries.
The labor share and unemployment
In this subsection, we provide some evidence in line with our theory that the overall changes in European labor shares broadly mirror changes in unemployment rates. European unemployment massively increased during the 1980s, and stayed high afterwards. By contrast, Anglo-Saxon unemployment rates did not change much. To quote Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) , for the major Continental European countries, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, "the major decline in the share in the 1980s coincided with a further increase in the unemployment rate during that decade". However the theory predicts that there is no link between the labor share and the unemployment rate for Anglo-Saxon countries.
We regress the labor share on the unemployment rate. Table 3 emphasizes the divide between the two subsets of countries. We proceed to …xed-e¤ects regressions. We estimate a single coe¢ cient for the whole sample and for each subsample of countries. The results show that the coe¢ cient is generally negative, and much larger for European countries than for Anglo-Saxon countries. The idea we put forward in this paper is that such a correlation between the labor share and the unemployment rate re ‡ects the impact of an X factor that jointly determines the labor shares and corresponding unemployment rates. This X factor is trade globalization, and mostly trade with labor-abundant economies.
Legal origin Estimated coe¢ cient
Common law/Anglo-Saxon 0:04 We now investigate in more details the prediction of the model that trade should increase the share of the capital intensive sector in the economy, leading to a decrease in the labor share.
Fixed-e¤ects regressions
We proceed to the following …xed e¤ects regressions:
where EU is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if civil law is the legal origin of the country and 0 otherwise. We regress the share of the capital-intensive super-sector SS for country i at time t on trade and its interaction with the dummy EU. The statistical model allows us to test whether trade with China has a distinctive and signi…cantly positive e¤ect on the weight of the capital-intensive sector in civil-law countries. Theory, therefore, predicts that parameter 1 is positive. country i at time t. At given relative factor price, the Rybczinski theorem predicts that capital intensity should increase the weight of the capital-intensive sector. In each case, we use the capital-labor ratio speci…c to the set of sectors we focus on (namely, the overall, business and tradable sectors). Note that we use the labor input adjusted for the number of hours worked, available in the KLEMS dataset.
Finally, we add country …xed e¤ects and time dummies. Country …xed e¤ects control for time-invariant unobserved characteristics that are correlated with trade and the weight of the capital-intensive sector. We need an instrument that is highly correlated with the trade variables, but is not related to sector shares in developed countries. The Fraser Institute provides various institutional variables for developing countries over a long time range. Institutions in developing countries are not necessarily correlated with sector shares in developed countries, and could well be correlated with trade development with China.
All the variables take values between 0 (highly regulated) and 10 (no regulation). 7
We choose the variable "Access to Sound Money" (ASM) in china which should be exogenous to the share of the capital-intensive super-sector in developed countries. 8 The inclusion of other instruments leads to a strong rejection of the Hansen overidenti…cation test of instrument exogeneity. The correlation of this variable with trade is due to the fact that people involved in international trade need to convert foreign money, and to have banking accounts in foreign countries to pay, to receive payments, and borrow money (see Berman and Héricourt, 2010) . The variable is available since 1970.
The other instruments are more usual. We consider trade and trade*EU lagged 10 years. Such trade ‡ows are not related to the share of the capital-intensive sector ten years later. In addition, they have been available since 1960. 7 The list is the following: "Economic Freedom", "Size of Government", "Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights", "Access to Sound Money", "Freedom to Trade Internationally", and "Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business".
These variables are de…ned over 5-year periods, from 1980 to 2005 for most, and for 1970-2005 for "Access to Sound Money"
and "Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business". We complete the variables by linear interpolation. 8 The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to 'high annual money growth', 'high variation in the annual rate of in ‡ation', 'high in ‡ation rate', and 'restricted foreign currency bank accounts' and 10 corresponds to 'low annual money growth', 'low or no variation in the annual rate of in ‡ation', 'low in ‡ation rate', and 'foreign currency bank accounts are permissible without restrictions'.
First-stage regressions are the following:
The excluded instruments are ASM t , ASM t EU i , T rade it 10 , and T rade it 10 EU i . The included instruments are all the regressors but trade variables: country …xed e¤ects, time e¤ects and capital to labor ratio (as a result, …rst stage regressions di¤er with the …eld of the economy we focus on).
In appendix A1, Table A1 .1 displays the results. We only report the coe¢ cients of the …rst stage regression associated with the excluded instruments. Results suggest our instruments are reasonably strong. 9 . We report the F statistic, Partial R 2 and the shea partial R 2 for each …rst stage regressions. Shea (1997) partial R 2 is much higher than the standard partial R 2 suggesting instruments are independant and there exists no redundancies across instruments (see Baum et al, 2003) . Finally, in table 4, for each regression, we quantify the bias of IV compared to the bias of OLS due to the potential weakness of instruments using the stock and yogo (2005) The results for trade are in line with theory. Trade has a highly di¤erentiated impact on the sector shares for common law and civil law countries.Trade has no signi…cant impact on sector share in common-law countries for the overall economy (SS1). It even has a negative and signi…cant impact for the business sector (SS2). By contrast, trade has a strong positive and signi…cant e¤ect in civil-law countries. The di¤erentiated impact seems to be smaller for the tradable sector (SS3). However, the labor share di¤erential between the capital-and labor-intensive super-sectors is larger in this latter case.
Those results are in line with the descriptive evidence on the evolution of the sector shares provided in the previous section.
From the sector share to the labor share
Using our estimates, we can quantify the impact of trade with China on the capital-intensive sector share, and then on aggregate labor share. The rise in trade is roughly similar across countries. It increases by about 1.5 percentage points of GDP. In this section we focus on the impact for the whole economy (SS1). The …rst line of Overall, the predicted di¤erential labor share change between Continental Europe and the US-UK is not far from the observed one. For instance, our preferred estimate, the IV estimate, predicts a 1.8-point di¤erence, which is about 60% of the observed di¤erence.
Our study provides a lower bound to the magnitude of trade e¤ects on factor reallocation. Sectorial data do not allow us to capture the whole phenomenon of factor reallocation predicted by trade theories based on factor endowment heterogeneity. Schott (2003 Schott ( , 2004 for instance shows that factor intensities vary considerably within a sector. In addition, within-product specialization alters our ability to distinguish capital-intensive sectors from labor-intensive sectors. To quote Schott: "[The] evidence suggests that conventional tests of trade theory using industry level data are problematic because much of the endowment-driven specialization occurs at a level that was, until recently, hidden from the researcher."
Conclusion
This paper questions the ability of the HOS model to reproduce the patterns of labor shares in two sets of countries. Namely, labor shares stay constant in Anglo-Saxon countries, and go down in continental European countries. In addition, the labor share does not change much at sector or …rm level. We show that once completed with a relative wage rigidity in Europe, the model can predict such facts. The key mechanism at work relies on the fact that trade globalization with developing or newly industrialized countries increases European unemployment. Factors are reallocated towards low labor-share sectors in Europe, which decreases the aggregate labor share.
The model predictions are broadly con…rmed by the empirical evidence at sector-level data. We 
